Levada Center's July survey recorded 66% of Russians supporting the actions of their armed forces in Ukraine — its lowest reading since February 2022, and twelve points below the 78% it measured in July 2025. The sharper movement is in perceived success: half of respondents said the operation was progressing successfully, down nineteen points in a year, while the share saying it was going badly rose eleven points to 28% and the share unable to say reached 22%, the highest since the question was first asked. Appetite for talks is steady rather than growing — 62% favour moving to negotiations against 28% for continuing to fight — and it does not extend to concessions: a quarter would accept concessions to Ukraine and the West to reach a settlement, while 56% support intensifying strikes. Asked who is responsible for the absence of a peace deal, 32% named the European Union, 20% Ukraine, 19% the United States and 10% Russia. Economic sentiment moved in the same direction, Levada's consumer sentiment index falling to 94 in June, below the neutral 100 for the first time since October 2022. Stated readiness to protest rose over the year, from 13% to 16% on economic grievances and from 8% to 12% on political ones, but remains below the wartime peaks recorded in July 2024. The state-aligned pollsters register the same direction: VTsIOM's measure of support for the military as an institution fell from 76% to 65% across the year, and FOM found 54% describing the mood around them as anxious against 39% calm — a reversal of its June 2025 reading. Levada's companion release from the same July fieldwork records 57% describing the political situation in Russia as tense, up ten points since May 2025, and 13% as critical or explosive, up eight points since September 2025, while the share calling it calm fell fourteen points to 19%; Levada notes that comparable readings were last seen in September 2022, when the first mobilisation was announced. Among those answering negatively, 45% cite the war itself, 21% drone strikes on Russian territory, 9% economic crisis and prices, and 7% the petrol shortage. Every one of these figures carries the constraints of polling in wartime Russia. Levada's director, Denis Volkov, has published on how the political context shapes what respondents will say, arguing the larger distortion is the absence of competing public positions rather than fear of the interviewer; VTsIOM switched from telephone to in-person door-to-door interviewing in spring 2026, a change it attributes to call-screening and distrust of unknown numbers and which the political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann reads instead as a way of keeping its ratings from falling. The levels are therefore weaker evidence than the direction, which is why the year-on-year comparisons are given here. Levada's July fieldwork covered 1,612 adults in 137 localities across 50 federal subjects between July 21 and 28, conducted as in-home personal interviews and weighted to Rosstat data, with a stated margin of error of up to 3.4 points on values near 50%.