Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence (HUR)
55%credibility0 / 0 / 0
Why this score Ukraine's military intelligence service. Its assessments of Russian force generation, losses and internal planning are frequently detailed and have sometimes been corroborated later by Western services and by Russian legislative action; but it is a belligerent's intelligence arm briefing publicly during a war, and its public releases serve an information-operations purpose alongside an informational one. Its claims about Russian intentions are recorded as claims and are not treated as established until a second, disinterested chain corroborates them.
Tracked statements
2
? unverified
“As of 12 October 2026 it [the cooling pond] stood at 12.27 metres against 12.34 metres at the start of the month… A water level of 15 metres is considered the minimum necessary to fully meet the plant’s needs.” The occupiers “are considering reducing the number of backup generators kept in automatic standby mode… In parallel, options for covert fuel supply, including of low quality, without notifying the IAEA mission, are being worked out.” “Ukraine proposed applying voltage to the 750 kV ‘Dniprovska’ power line via the line of the 330 kV ‘Ferosplavna-1’ substation… However, the Kremlin rejected this proposal.” (Translated from Ukrainian.)
Ukraine’s military intelligence describing a plant Russia holds. It does not say who measured the pond, and no IAEA update has reported these levels, a cut in standby generators or the rejected proposal. The IAEA did report in late September that only four of 20 generators would start automatically.
The Russian General Staff has prepared a scenario for the additional mobilisation of 600,000 people across 2026 and 2027 — 300,000 in each year — chiefly to bring units fighting Ukraine up to strength; Putin will most likely decide after the 18–20 September State Duma elections.
A belligerent's intelligence services briefing on the other side's internal planning, recorded as their claim. The supporting figures they gave — 240,000 Russian personnel lost January–July against 232,000 contract recruits, convict-recruitment categories widened, 15–60 days' training — are part of the claim, not corroboration of it.